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Introduction 
 
Spatial theories of voting have provided one of the leading frameworks for the analysis 
of electoral competition and electoral behavior. Spatial theories assume that : (1) voters 
and parties have policy preferences, (2) these preferences can be represented by points 
in the policy space and (3) voters’ electoral choice is affected by the disposition of their 
own preferences and of those of political parties. For almost four decades proximity 
theory has been the most popular spatial theory of voting1. Proximity theory suggested 
that voters value parties on the basis of how proximate they are to their own personal 
position. This point had an obvious implication. If voters value proximity, then parties 
competing in two party systems should converge toward the position of the median 
voter to maximize their chances to win an election. Ironically even some of the scholars 
who were otherwise critical of proximity theory accepted the notion of convergence and 
little attention was paid to the fact that in two-party systems parties were actually not 
converging2. The validity of proximity theory was questioned by what became known 
                                                 
1 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper and Row, 1957.  
2 Giovanni Sartori is an obvious case in point in this respect. While Sartori devoted some attention to 
criticize and revise the Downsian theory, he assumed centripetal convergence as one of the peculiar 
features of two-party systems. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for 
Analysis, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p 191 and pp. 324 and ff.  See also Giovanni 
Sartori, “Modelli Spaziali di Competizione Tra Partiti” in Giovanni Sartori, Teoria dei Partiti e Caso 
Italiano, Milano, SugarCO, 1982, pp. 45-62. An explanation for why parties do not converge in two-party 
systems can be found in Stuart Elaine Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, “Solving the paradox of 
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as the directional theory of voting. This theory suggests that voters prefer parties and 
candidates which are on their side of a given policy dimension3. 
 The directional theory of voting has generated a large and growing body of 
research. Studies conducted in the directional theory framework have tested the 
empirical validity of the model, have tried to incorporate uncertainty into the model 
itself, have explained how directionality theory and proximity theory can be combined, 
and, above all, have attempted to show why directional theory is superior to proximity 
theory4. These claims have encountered some resistance among proximity theorists. 
Proximity theory scholars have argued that the success of directional theory is rather 
illusory. They so argue on three grounds: (1) that directional theory is less falsifiable 
than proximity theory; (2) that the empirical evidence provided in support of 
directionality theory is inadequate to sustain its claims; and (3) that when proper 
empirical analyses are performed, there is little evidence supporting the directional 
theory of issue voting5.  
                                                                                                                                               
nonconvergence: valence, position, and direction in democratic politics”, Electoral Studies, vol. 17, n. 3, 
(September) 1998, pp. 281-300.  
3 George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine MacDonald, “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting”, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 83, n. 1, 1989, pp. 93-121.  
4 Empirical analyses performed to test the empirical validity of directional theory can be found in  George 
Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting”, cit., pp. 93-121; Stuart 
Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz and Ola Listhaug, “On Attempting to Rehabilitate Proximity 
Theory: Sometimes the Patient Just Can’t be Helped”, Journal of Politics, vol. 60, n. 3, (August) 1998, pp. 
653-690. An attempt to incorporate uncertainty in the directional model was made by Stuart Elaine 
Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, “Direction and Uncertainty in a Model of Issue Voting”, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, vol. 5, n. 1, 1993, pp. 61-87. How directionality and proximity models can be 
combined is discussed by Irwin L. Morris and George Rabinowitz, “On the Coexistence of Directional 
and Proximity Voters”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 9, n. 1, (January) 1997, pp. 75-88. 
5 Anders Westholm, “Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity Theory of the 
Electoral Choice”, American Political Science Review, vol. 91, n. 4, (December) 1997, pp. 865-897. See 
also Anders Westholm, “On the Return of Epicycles: Some Crossroads in Spatial Modeling Revisited”, 
Journal of Politics, vol. 63, n. 2, (May) 2001, pp. 436-481. Lewis and King argued  instead that the 
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This paper joins the proximity vs. directionality debate to argue that the real 
issue is not whether directionality theory is better than proximity theory. The paper 
argues that neither proximity theory nor directionality theory provide an adequate 
framework for spatial analyses. By postulating an individual relation between the voter 
and the party proximity theory and directional theory postulate that voters evaluate 
parties’ stances relative to their own personal position. But by doing so proximity 
theory and directional theory are both unable to account for the inherently social 
character of the vote choice.  
The paper then introduces a new, subjective approach to the study of issue 
voting. In contrast to both proximity theory and directional theory, the subjective 
approach provides a framework for spatial analysis that accounts for the social character 
of the vote choice. The subjective approach claims that voters do not evaluate parties’ 
positions relative to their own. Rather voters judge the position of the party system 
relative to position of the whole electorate.       
The paper is divided into four parts. Section One begins by arguing that both 
proximity and directionality theory are unable to understand how voters relate to and 
evaluate political parties because they reduce political relationships to economic ones. 
Section One then introduces the subjective approach which, in contrast to both 
proximity theory and directionality theory, explicitly considers the social character of 
                                                                                                                                               
evidence provided by both proximity theorists and directionality theorists is inadequate to prove that one 
theory is superior to the other because the assumptions made by these theories cannot be tested on the 
basis of existing methods and data.  See Jeffrey B. Lewis and Gary King, “No Evidence on Directional vs. 
Proximity Voting”, Political Analysis, vol. 8, n. 1, pp. 21-33.  
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the vote choice. Section Two discusses what empirical analyses can be performed to test 
which of these spatial analytic theories has the greatest explanatory power. This Section 
argues that the explanatory power of proximity theory can be tested by measuring the 
percentage of voters who report not seeing any inter-party difference and who perceive 
parties to be equidistant from where they locate themselves on the left-right continuum6. 
The explanatory power of directionality theory can be tested by calculating the 
percentage of the voters who report not seeing inter-party differences placing parties on 
the same position on the left-right continuum. In order to compare the explanatory 
power of proximity theory, of directionality theory, and of the subjective approach 
presented in the paper we shall run then a logistic regression model. Section Three then 
points out the weaknesses of both proximity and directional theory. Section Three finds 
that the coefficients estimated by the logistic regression analysis are consistent with the 
claim that our subjective approach provides a better explanation than either proximity 
theory and directional theory  for why voters do not see inter-party differences.  Section 
Four discusses some implications of these findings. 
  
                                                 
6 The reason why I chose to use the left-right dimension instead of using, more specific issue dimension, 
is that a position on the left-right dimension indicates all a voter or a party stands for. It has been noted 
that “knowing where a party stands means knowing what it stands for”, see Riccardo Pelizzo, Cartel 
Parties and Cartel Party Systems, Unpublished Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2003, ch. 4. A 
similar point can be found in Norberto Bobbio, Destra e Sinistra. Ragioni e Significati di una Distinzione 
Politica, Roma, Donzelli, 1994 and more recently in John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, “Expert 
Interpretations of Party Space and party Locations in 42 Societies”, Party Politics, vol. 1, n. 1, 1995, pp. 
111-ff. The importance of the left-right placement is such that it can be considered a sort of super issue, 
see Russell Dalton, Citizens Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Democracies, 
Chatam, Chatam House Publisher, 1996; see also Stefano Bartolini, “Collusion, Competition and 
Democracy, Part I”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 11, n. 4, pp. 435-470 and especially p. 452. 
, 
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Section One: Proximity, Directionality and the Subjective Approach 
  
Both proximity models and directionality models of electoral choice can be used to 
explain two very simple phenomena that is why a voter prefers one party over another 
one and why a voter is left indifferent by two different parties. 
For proximity theory voters are utility maximizers that is their preferences as 
well as parties preferences can be represented in a policy space or dimension, and voters 
prefer the party which is closest to their own position on that dimension.    
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 shows a situation in which a voter (V) can choose between two parties (A, B). 
Here the distance between A and V is only 2 units, while the distance between V and B 
is 5 units. According to proximity theory the voter will cast her ballot for A because it is 
the party closest to her own position.  
Proximity theory also holds that a voter may be left indifferent by two parties if, 
as shown in Figure 2, they are both at the same distance from the voter herself. If the 
utility attached to a party by a given voter is function of distance between the position 
of the party and the position of the voter, and if two parties are equidistant from the 
voter, then the voter does not have a utility-based reason to prefer one party over the 
other. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Directional theorists have argued that the proximity model is vitiated by several 
problems. The most important of these problems, directional theorists claim, is that “the 
vast majority of voters (does) not see issues in the sharp positional fashion that the 
traditional theory assumes”7. On the contrary, directional theorists argue, “issues are 
perceived rather diffusely”8. Voters see political issues in a diffuse way instead of “the 
sharp positional fashion that the traditional theory assumes”9. In order for issues to have 
a political impact, directional theorists claim, they must be able to evoke emotions in 
the voters. Hence, directional theorists argue, in order to understand the impact of a 
political issue we need to know whether a voter feels favorable or not toward that issue 
(that is we need to know the voter’s direction) and we also need to know the magnitude 
of her feeling toward the issue (that is we need to know the intensity of the voter’s 
feelings about an issue). Thus for directional theorists voters’ assessment of a given 
party does not reflect how close that party is to the voter’s position. Instead voter’s 
assessment of a given party reflects (1)  whether the voter and the party are on the same 
side of a given issue (direction) and (2) how important that issue is for both the voter 
and the party (intensity). The combination of direction and intensity generates what 
                                                 
7 George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting”, cit., vol. 83, 
n. 1, 1989, pp. 93-121. The quote is taken from p. 94.  
8  Ivi, p. 94. The first criticism of proximity theory was formulated by Donald E. Stokes, “Spatial Models 
of Party Competition”, American Political Science Review, vol. 57, n. 2, (June) 1963, pp. 368-377. 
9 George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting”, cit., vol. 83, 
n. 1, 1989, p. 94.   
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directional theorists call the  “directional effect”. This effect is estimated by the 
following formula10:  
(party position – neutral point) x (voter position – neutral point). 
 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
As it will soon be clear, proximity models and directional models of electoral choice 
generate quite different results. Let us look at Figure 3. According to proximity theory 
the voter V would prefer party B over party A because the distance between V and B is 
only two units while the distance between A and V is of three units. The opposite is true 
for directional theory. According to directional theory the voter V will prefer A over B 
because A and V are on the same side of the issue and because the issue is fairly 
important for party A. If we enter into the formula the data presented in Figure 3, we 
find that the directional effect of A is relatively strong and positive  (+4), while the 
directional effect of B is fairly weak and negative (-1). Even more interesting is what 
directional theory has to say about Figure 2. In spite of the fact that both parties are on 
the voter’s side of the issue, voter V will prefer party A over party B because the issue 
is more important to A and, therefore, A’s directional effect is greater. If we enter in the 
formula the data presented in Figure 2, we find that the directional effect of A is 12 
while that of B is 6. 
                                                 
10 George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting”, cit., p. 97. 
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Directional theory also explains why two parties may leave a voter indifferent. 
This occurs when both parties take the same position on a given issue regardless of 
where the voter stands.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
By taking the same position on an issue, the directional effect of both parties is identical 
and the voter has no way to decide between the two parties. 
We are now in a position to see why these theories are unsatisfactory. Both 
theories assume that voters evaluate parties’ stances relative to their own personal 
position. But this assumption is however inconsistent with the findings of empirical 
economic voting studies. Recent economic voting studies have shown that when a voter 
evaluates the economic performance of the incumbent, she does not evaluate that 
performance on the basis of her own economic conditions. Instead the voter evaluates  
the incumbent’s performance on the basis of the general economic conditions of the 
whole country. In the words of Lewis-Beck “the strong (economic) motivation is 
collective or “sociotropic” (…) rather than personal or “pocketbook”11. For example, 
assuming that unemployment is an important policy issue, the voter rewards/punishes 
the incumbent on the basis of the unemployment rate in the country rather than on the 
basis of whether she is unemployed or not. As Lewis-Beck noted, voters consider 
themselves responsible for their own economic conditions, while they consider the 
                                                 
11 This quote as well as a discussion of the literature can be found in Michael Lewis-Beck, Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, 1990, 1st paperback edition, p. 37 and passim.  
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government responsible for the economic conditions of the country. If voters evaluate 
parties’ positions on policy issues in the same way in which they assess incumbents’ 
economic performance, that is socially rather than individually, then they judge parties’ 
positions relative to the position of the whole electorate rather than evaluating parties’ 
positions relative to their own position. In other words, a key assumption made by both 
proximity theory and directionality theory is false.        
This analysis is consistent not only with the findings of economic voting studies, 
but also with most of the traditional party studies12. According to these studies parties 
are organizations that perform several functions—they bridge the gap between society 
and the state, they integrate previously un-represented or under-represented groups into 
the political system, they select political personnel, they run (candidates) for office and, 
in case they win the elections, they govern13. One of the most important functions that 
parties are expected to perform is to listen to voters’ demands, and to aggregate them 
into coherent electoral platforms on which they campaign at election time14. Therefore, 
if a voter knows that parties are instruments of social aggregation, then she will not 
evaluate a party on the basis of its ability to address her own demands –as represented 
by her position in the political space – but will instead evaluate a party on the basis of 
its ability to address society’s demands –as represented by the electorate’s position in 
the political space.  
                                                 
12 A discussion of the literature can be found in Peter Mair, “Introduction”, in Peter Mair (ed.), The West 
European Party System, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1990, p.1 and ff.  
13 Ivi, p. 1. 
14 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, 
p. 20. 
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However, parties are not atoms that exist in a vacuum. They exist in their 
relation to other parties, to the electorate and to other parties’ relations to the electorate. 
The fact that a party’s existence is embedded in this web of relations has some 
consequences for how parties position themselves on various policy dimensions. The 
position that a party takes on a policy dimension is influenced by the positions that the 
electorate and other parties take on that issue. The fact that parties’ existence is 
embedded in this web of relations allows one to reformulate Sartori’s proposition that 
“each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, 
competitively or otherwise, to the other parties”15. In competitive party systems, each 
party is a function of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the 
presence and the position of other parties. Therefore in judging whether parties are in 
fact different from each other, whether they provide clear alternatives or not, and 
whether they satisfy the electorate’s demands or not, a voter evaluates the position of 
the whole party system relative to the electorate’s position16.  
In light of this argument, I suggest that parties leave a voter indifferent when 
there is a gap between the perceived position of the party system and that of the 
electorate. I also suggest that voters become increasingly indifferent to parties as the 
distance between the electorate’s position and the perceived position of the party system 
increases. 
 
                                                 
15 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1976, p. 44.  
16 Riccardo Pelizzo, Cartel Parties and Cartel Party Systems, Unpublished Dissertation, Johns Hopkins 
University, 2003.  
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Section Two: Testing the Cases 
 
Surveys conducted in several Western European countries in the past two decades have 
asked respondents whether they think that parties are too similar to provide clear 
political alternatives, and whether they think that parties have different policy objectives. 
Answers to these survey questions provide exactly the kind of evidence that we need to 
test whether voters’ behavior is best explained by proximity theory, by directionality 
theory, or by the subjective approach. When a voter says that two parties do not provide 
clear alternatives, she is effectively saying that two parties are indistinguishable. The 
fact that parties are perceived as being indistinguishable has important implications for 
spatial theories of voting. It implies that for voters the utility attached to a political party, 
say the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) is as great as the utility attached to the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In these circumstances, therefore, voters can no 
longer detect any party difference (in terms of utils). The major difference between 
proximity theorists and directional theorists is over why parties are perceived to be no 
longer making a difference. For proximity theorists, two parties have the same utility 
for a given voter if they are equi-distant from the voter’s position. For directional 
theorists, two parties have the same amount of utility for a voter only when they are on 
the same side of an issue and have the same intensity on that issue –this combination of 
circumstances occurs only when parties occupy the same position. 
 Here a question arises: what generates voters’ inability to see any difference 
between the SPD and the CDU? Proximity theory answers that the inability is generated 
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by the fact that parties are equidistant from the position of the voter. Directional theory 
answers that the inability is generated by the fact that parties occupy the same position 
on a given issue. The subjective theory presented above answers that the inability is due 
to the fact that the party system is moving away from the electorate. 
 Let us now treat these three theories’ answers as competing hypotheses to be 
tested analyzing the data from the 1998 Deutsche nationale Wahlstudien (German 
National Election Study). Our statistical tests of these competing hypotheses are 
straightforward. We begin with proximity theory. For proximity theory a voter is 
indifferent between two (or more) parties only when these parties are equidistant from 
the voter herself. Once we have identified the voters who report that they do not see any 
difference between two or more parties, we try to see whether voters do not see inter-
party differences because they perceive parties to be equidistant from their own position. 
To test whether this is the case, we measure the distance between one party and the 
voter, the distance between the voter and the second party, and then subtract one 
distance from the other. If the result of this subtraction is zero, then the findings of our 
analyses support the proximity theory’s hypothesis. If the result of the subtraction is 
other than zero, then the findings of our analyses discredit the proximity theory’s 
hypothesis. 
To test the explanatory power of directional theory we test whether voters who 
report seeing no difference between parties do so because they perceive parties to 
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occupy the same position in the political space17. To test whether this is actually the 
case, we subtract a party positional score from that of the other party. If the result is 
zero, then our findings are consistent with directional theory. If the result is other than 
zero, then our findings discredit directional theory.   
 To test the explanatory power of our subjective approach, we measure the 
distance between the position of the electorate and the position of the party system. This 
variable is measured in the following way. Election surveys ask respondents to locate 
themselves on the left-right scale18. On the basis of voters’ self-placement on the scale, 
we compute the average voter position. The average voter position is adopted as the 
indicator of the electorate’ s location on the left-right continuum. Election surveys also 
ask respondents to locate parties on the left-right scale. The scale is the same as the one 
adopted for respondents’ self-placement on the left-right continuum. On the basis of 
voters’ responses, we compute the position of each of the relevant parties in the party 
system. Parties are identified as relevant if they have either coalition potential or 
blackmail potential. According to Sartori a party has coalition potential “if it  finds itself 
in a position to determine over time, or at some point in time, at least one of the possible 
governmental majorities”19, while a party has a blackmail potential when it can prevent 
a government coalition from being formed or when “it alters the direction of 
                                                 
17 This test is appropriate because it is only when two parties occupy the same position that they have the 
same direction, intensity, and, therefore, directional effect on the voter. 
18 The German National Election Studies use an 11-point scale, where value ‘1’ indicates left, value ‘11’ 
indicates right and value ‘6’ indicates center. The center value corresponds exactly to what the directional 
theorists call the neutral point.  
19 See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, op. cit., p. 122. 
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competition” 20. On the basis of two criteria, how many parties should be considered as 
relevant in Germany in the 1976-98 period? We must consider the SPD, the CDU, the 
Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Liberal Party (FDP) as relevant because they 
were all, at one point or another, members of a government coalition. By contrast, in the 
period under examination, the Greens do not qualify for relevance. In fact, until 1998 
the Greens were not needed to form a government coalition and hence did not have 
coalition potential. Second, the Greens did not have blackmail potential because their 
appearance did not alter the pattern of inter-party competition, which remained solidly 
bipolar, and the Greens were never needed to form a government coalition. Having 
established which are the relevant parties in Germany, the party system’s location on 
the left-right dimension for a given voter is estimated by adding the left-right scores 
given by that voter to the relevant parties and by dividing the result of the sum by the 
number of relevant parties. By computing the average of the party system’s location for 
all voters, we obtain our estimate of the party system position. The distance between the 
party system position and the position of the electorate is calculated by subtracting the 
electorate’s position from the position of the party system. 
  Having estimated this new variable, we may now perform a second statistical 
analysis to test whether voters’ inability to see any inter-party difference is best 
explained by proximity theory, by directional theory, or by the subjective approach. Our 
response variable is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 when a voter reports not 
seeing any inter-party difference and taking value 0 when she reports seeing differences. 
                                                 
20 See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, op. cit., p. 122-123. 
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This variable is labeled as NODIFF. By running a logistic regression, we can compare 
and contrast the explanatory power of proximity theory, of directional theory, and of the 
subjective approach. Now according to proximity theory, we should expect to find that 
an increase in the difference between the distance between the position of a party and a 
voter and the distance between the position of another party and the same voter (this 
variable is labeled as PROXI), should reduce the probability that a voter does not see 
any difference between the two parties. According to directional theory, we should find 
that an increase in the distance between the position of two parties (this variable is 
labeled as DIRE) leads to a decrease in the probability that a voter sees no difference 
between the parties. According to our subjective approach, an increase in the distance 
between the position of the electorate and the position of the party system (variable is 
labeled as GAP) should increase the probability that a voter does not see inter-party 
differences. 
 
Section Three: Some Evidence 
 
In 1998 41.6 percent of the German electorate detected no difference between German 
parties. The fact that such a large percentage of German voters did not detect inter-party 
differences is not explained very well by either by proximity theory or directional 
theory. In fact, only 5.4 percent of the cases was consistent with directionality theory 
and only 13.1 percent of the cases was consistent with proximity theory. These results 
are somewhat problematic for these two theories because spatial theories of political 
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competition, like all economic theories, “ask to be judged by the accuracy of their 
predictions and refuse to discuss the realism of their assumptions” and in this case their 
predictions are inaccurate21. Data are presented in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 When we perform the logistic regression and evaluate the strength of the 
relationship between the independent variables on the basis of the unstandardized 
coefficients, we find that GAP has the strongest effect, followed by PROXI, while 
DIRE is not statistically significant22. Results of the Logistic Regression are presented 
in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 What the logistic regression coefficients tell us is that each unit increase in GAP is 
associated with an increase of .155 in logit(NODIFF), that each unit increase in PROXI 
is associated with a decrease of .050 in logit(NODIFF), and that each unit increase in 
DIRE is associated with an increase of .004 in logit(NODIFF). The meaning of the first  
coefficient is that when the party system moves away from the position of the electorate, 
the probability that a voter sees no inter-party difference increases. The meaning of the 
second coefficient  is that as parties move away from a position of equidistance from 
                                                 
21 The quote is taken from Stefano Bartolini, “Collusion, Competition and Democracy”, cit., p. 437. 
22 Since each of these three variables is estimated on the same 11-point left-right scale, there is no need to 
use standardized logistic regression coefficients to compare the strength of the relationship between each 
of the independent variables and the dependent variable.   
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the position of the voter, the probability that the voter sees no inter-party difference 
declines. In other words the logistic regression coefficients for both GAP and PROXI 
are consistent with what the subjective approach and proximity theory would lead one 
to expect. The logistic regression coefficients indicate that the probability that a voter 
sees no inter-party difference experiences a (minimal) increases as the distance between 
the parties increases. Yet we  should note that the relationship between DIRE and 
NODIFF is not only very weak and with the wrong sign but is also statistically 
insignificant. 
 How changes in our independent variables influence the probability that a voter 
does not see any difference between various parties becomes apparent once we translate 
logits into the more easily understandable probabilities. The logistic regression 
coefficients presented in Table 2 can be written as an equation. The equation is 
logit(NODIFF) = .155 (GAP) - .050 (PROXI) + .004 (DIRE) -.480. Probabilities can be 
computed by replacing the variables in the equation with their values for actual cases. 
For example when a voter thinks that the position of the party system corresponds 
exactly to that of the electorate (GAP =0), that the difference between the distance of 
the SPD and herself and the distance between the CDU and herself is large (PROXI = 5) 
and that the distance between SPD and CDU is also large (DIRE = 5), the equation 
takes the following values:  
logit(NODIFF) = .155 (0) -.050 (5) + .004 (5) -.480 = -.710.  
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In this case the probability that the voters sees no inter-party difference is 
= .330 or 33 percent. When a voters instead perceives that the position of 
the party system is distant from that of the electorate (GAP = 5.75), that parties are 
equidistant from the voter herself (PROXI = 0) and that the parties occupy the same 
position (DIRE = 0), the equation takes the following values:  
)1/(
71.
71.
−− + ee
logit(NODIFF) = .155 (5.75) - .050 (0) + .004 (0) -.480 = .411.  
In this case the probability that a voter sees no inter-party difference is  
= .601 or  60 percent.   
)1/( 411.411. ee +
 From a substantive point of view the meaning of these findings is clear. The 
findings show : (1) that the gap between the position of the electorate and the position 
of the party system affects the probability that a voter fails to see inter-party differences; 
(2) that the gap between the position of the electorate and the position of the party 
system has a stronger and statistically more significant influence on whether voters see 
no inter-party differences than the other variables included in the model; and, therefore,  
(3) that the subjective approach provides a better explanation than either proximity 
theory and directional theory for why voters do not see inter-party differences.  
 
Section Four 
 
The fact that the subjective approach provides a better explanation of voters’ 
behavior than both proximity theory and directionality theory is very important not only 
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for party scholars but also for party politicians. For many years after the publication of 
Downs’s work, proximity models have been the dominant framework for spatial 
analyses of electoral choice. On this model voters are rational utility-maximizers, they 
vote for the party that is expected to maximize their utility, where utility is considered 
as a function of the distance between the position of the voter and that of a party along a 
given dimension. Specifically, the utility a voter expects to receive from voting for a 
party increases as the distance between that voter and that party decreases. The 
proximity model of voting behavior has obvious consequences for parties’ strategy. The 
model purports to show that in order to maximize their electoral returns, parties need to 
reduce the distance between their position and the position of the median voter and they 
do so by moving toward the center position. 
 Moving toward the center is exactly what the German SPD decided to do to 
revive its electoral competitiveness. The secretary of the SPD tried to improve the 
SPD’s electoral fortunes by launching the idea of a Neue Mitte, that is of a New Center. 
From a substantive or policy-oriented point of view, the idea of a New Center was used 
to emphasize the SPD’s commitment to economic and social policies which had little, if 
anything to do, with the tradition of the Left. But form is sometimes more important 
than substance and symbols are sometimes more important than policies. Hence, it is  
remarkable that a party of the Left defines its new position and, with it, its new political 
role in a ‘center’ (Mitte) however new. 
 The data presented in Table 3 show that German voters did indeed perceive the 
SPD’s centripetal convergence. These data also show that the SPD’ s centripetal 
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convergence or rightward move is partially responsible for the right-ward shift of the 
German party system. In fact, while both the CDU and the CSU were perceived to be 
adjusting their position by moving toward the left, the SPD and the FDP were perceived 
to be shifting to the right. And since the rightward move of FDP and SPD was greater 
than the leftward move of the CDU and the CSU, the whole party system was perceived 
to be moving toward the right while the German electorate was slowly moving toward 
the left. The simultaneous leftward shift of the electorate and the rightward shift of the 
party system cause a widening gap between the electorate and the party system. In fact, 
the gap between the electorate and the party system grew from .40 in 1976 to more than 
1.3 in 1998. Data are reported in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In any event, the centripetal convergence and/or rightward move of the parties 
of the Left represents a rational and legitimate strategic move only as long as voters are 
really concerned with parties’ positions. The results of the statistical analyses presented 
in this paper show that voters might not be so concerned. Voters’ perception of the lack 
of political alternatives is related not to the position of individual parties but instead to 
the gap between the position of the electorate and that of the party system. If voters’ 
perception of parties’ utility (and voters’ electoral choice) is constructed in the same 
way in which voters perceive political alternatives, that is by paying attention to the gap 
between the position of the electorate and that of the party system, then it is not obvious 
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that centripetal convergence represents the best possible strategy to maximize electoral 
returns. The subjective approach makes us wonder whether it is rational for the SPD to 
move centripetally or rightward (and to contribute to shifting the whole party system 
further to the right) exactly when the electorate is moving left-ward. It does not make 
much sense for a party of the Left to attempt to satisfy voters’ demand for more Left by 
turning right.   
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Figure 1. Issue Dimension to Illustrate Utility  
Calculations Using Proximity Models 
 
                A             V                                    B  
׀-----׀-----׀-----׀ -----׀-----׀-----׀----- ׀-----׀-----׀ -----׀  
-5   -4     -3     -2    -1     0      1      2      3       4     5 
 
 
Figure 2. Issue Dimension to Illustrate Utility  
Calculations Using Proximity Models 
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Figure 3. Issue Dimension to Illustrate Utility  
Calculations Using Directional Models 
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Figure 4. Issue Dimension to Illustrate Utility  
Calculations Using Directional Models 
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Table 1. The explanatory power of Proximity Theory and Directionality Theory 
% of voters not seeing inter-party differences 
placing SPD and CDU on the left-right continuum 
% of voters not seeing inter-party differences 
placing SPD and CDU at the same distance from 
their own position 
%                       of                         N %                       of                         N 
5.4                                               2978 13.1                                             2789 
Source: Juergen Falter, Oscar W. Gabriel, and Hans Rattinger, Politische Einstellungen, politische 
Participation und Waehlerverhalten in Vereiningten Deutschland. Deutsche nationale Wahlstudie zur 
Bundestagswahl 1998, Koeln, Zentralarchiv fuer Sozialforschung an der Universitaet zu Koeln 
[distributor], ZA 3066. 
 
Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis for Voters’ inability to see inter-party differences 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficients (b) 
Standard Error of 
b 
Statistical 
Significance of b 
NODIFF GAP .155 .045 .001 
 PROXI -.050 .029 .080 
 DIRE .004 .026 .885 
 CONSTANT -.480 .095 .000 
Source: Juergen Falter, Oscar W. Gabriel, and Hans Rattinger, Politische Einstellungen, politische 
Participation und Waehlerverhalten in Vereiningten Deutschland. Deutsche nationale Wahlstudie zur 
Bundestagswahl 1998, Koeln, Zentralarchiv fuer Sozialforschung an der Universitaet zu Koeln 
[distributor], ZA 3066. 
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Table 3. The Changing Gap between the Position of the Electorate and that of the Party System in 
Germany, 1976-98. 
Year SPD CDU FDP CSU Party 
System 
Electorate GAP 
1976 3.76 8.35 5.53 9.15 6.7 6.30 .40 
1976 3.61 8.44 5.31 9.36 6.67 6.17 .50 
1976 3.35 8.30 5.05 9.21 6.48 6.18 .30 
1980 4.38 8.21 5.76 8.94 6.82 6.40 .43 
1980 4.24 8.24 5.70 9.10 6.82 6.23 .59 
1983 4.22 8.46 7.03 9.18 7.22 6.19 1.03 
1983 4.05 8.55 7.03 9.31 7.23 6.17 1.06 
1987 3.98 8.44 7.16 9.13 7.18 6.25 .93 
1987 3.66 8.76 7.39 9.42 7.30 6.13 1.17 
1987 3.64 8.65 7.26 9.41 7.23 6.16 1.07 
1990 4.14 8.13 6.85 8.89 7.0 6.09 .91 
1990 4.09 8.17 6.83 8.87 6.99 6.06 .93 
1990 4.24 8.04 6.80 8.74 6.95 6.11 .84 
1994      5.56  
1994      5.51  
1998 4.28 7.23 6.56 8.07 6.55 5.20 1.35 
1998 4.11 7.42 6.66 8.24 6.62 5.30 1.32 
Sources: The 1976 data are taken from ZA-Studiennummer :0823 Titel: Wahlstudie 1976 (Panel zur 
Bundestagswahl), Studie wurde durchgefuerth von der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim von: 
Manfred Berger, Wolfgang G. Gibowski Edelgard Grueber, Dieter Roth and Wolfgang Schulte in 
Zusammenarbeit mit Max Kaase, Hans D. Klingemann (Zentrum fuer Umfragen, Methoden und 
Analysen, Mannheim) und Uwe Schlecht (Universitaet Hidelberg); the 1980 data are taken from ZA-
Studiennummer : 1053 Titel: Wahlstudie 1980. Studien wurde durchgefuerth von der Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen e.V. Mannheim, Juni und September in Zusammenarbeit mit Dieter Fuchs (ZUMA, Mannheim), 
Hand Dieter Klingemann (FU, Berlin) und Uwe Schlecht (Universitaet Heidelberg); the 1983 data are 
taken from ZA-Studiennummer: 1276 Titel: Wahlstudie 1983 Primaerforscher: Manfred Berger, 
Wolfgang G. Gibowski, Dieter Roth, Wolfgang Schulte, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim, max 
Kaase (Universitaet Mannheim), Hans Dieter Klingemann (FU, Berlin), Manfred Kuechler (ZUMA, 
Mannheim), Uwe Schlecht (Univeritaet Heidelberg); the 1987 are taken from ZA-Studiennummer: 1536 
Title: (Trenduntersuchungen). Die Studien von Januar 86 zur Januar 87 wurden durchgefuehrt von 
Manfred Berger, Wolfgang G. Gibowski, Wolfgang Schulte (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim). 
Zusaetzlich fuer Februar 87 Institut fuer Praxisorientierte Sozialforschung e.V. Mannheim;  
The 1987 data are also taken from ZA-Studiennummer: 1537 Titel: Wahlstudie 1987 (Panel Studie). Die 
Panel Studie wurde durchgefuerth von Manfred Berger, Wolfgang G. Gibowski, Dieter Roth and 
Wolfgang Schulte von der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim in ZUsammenarbeit mit Max 
Kaase (Universitaet Mannheim), Hans Dieter Klingemann (FU, Berlin), Manfred Kuechler (Florida State 
University) and Frnz aUrban Pappi (Universitaet Kiel); the 1990 data are taken from ZA-Studiennummer 
1919 Titel: Primaerforscher: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Mannheim in Zusammenarbeit mit Max 
Kaase (Universitaet Mannheim), Hans Dieter Klingemann (Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin), M. Kuechler 
(Hunter College, New York), Franz Urban Pappi (Universitaeten Kielund Mannheim) und H. A. Semetko 
(University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); the 1994 data are taken from ZA-Studiennummer: 3065 Titel: 
Politische Einstellungen, politische Participation und Waehlerverhalten in Vereiningten Deutschland. 
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Deutsche nationale Wahlstudie zur Bundestagswahl 1998, Juergen W. Falter (Universitaet Mainz), Oscar 
W. Gabrie (Universitaet Stuttgart) and Hans Rattinger (Universitaet Bamberg); the 1998 data are taken 
from ZA-Studiennummer: 3066 Titel: Politische Einstellungen, politische Participation und 
Waehlerverhalten in Vereiningten Deutschland. Deutsche nationale Wahlstudie zur Bundestagswahl 
1998, Juergen W. Falter (Universitaet Mainz), Oscar W. Gabrie (Universitaet Stuttgart) and Hans 
Rattinger (Universitaet Bamberg). 
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